Our study off ers additional insight into the Offi ce for Protection of Competition. It examines the Offi ce for Protection of Competition in terms of an input-processoutput model, defi nes the inputs needed for its activities and examines the outputs of its control activities. It also identifi es external factors (in the environment) that aff ect the performance and behavior of the Offi ce for Protection of Competition and have an impact on inspection activities. Th e theoretical background as well as assumptions are then subjected to empirical scrutiny. Th eoretical conclusions and recommendations for more eff ective control of public contracts are drawn from the conclusions which are established.
Introduction
EU countries spend, on average, about 14 % of GDP (European Commission 2014) on public procurement. In the Czech Republic, the volume of procurement was 13.7 % of GDP in 2015 (see the Annual Report of Public Procurement 2014 , MMR, May 2015 . Th is is a large sum of public resources. It therefore makes sense to look for ways to streamline public procurement and to improve the monitoring systems of public procurement.
Th e economic literature on the monitoring of public procurement focuses mainly on the problems of effi ciency in public procurement, creating a competitive and non-corrupt environment (see, e.g., Domberger and Rimmer 1994; Kuhlman and Johnson 1983; Lundsgaard 2002; Mikušová and Nemec 2013; Strand et al. 2011; Ochrana and Pavel 2013; Soukopová and Maly 2013) . By comparison, the analysis of the control of public contracts by the Offi ce for Protection of Competition (the OPC) has been relatively neglected. Examining the activity of the supervisory authority over public procurement is dealt with almost exclusively by legal works (see Bovis 2016; Graells 2015; in Jurčík 2014) . Institutional and economic study, however, remains neglected. In the scientifi c literature, we found only two economic studies (Pavel 2009; Schmidt 2014 ) which dealt specifi cally with examining the Offi ce for Protection of Competition (Offi ce for Protection of Competition) and the monograph Control in Public Administration (Nemec et al. 2010 ). Pavel (2009) aimed to identify what the response from contractors was when the OPC found infringements of the rules of competition. Th e author of the second study is Schmidt (2014) . It is inspired by the models of Andreoni (1991) , Bose (1995) , Lott (1996) and Motchenkova (2008) and performs an econometric analysis of the amount of fi nes imposed by the OPC. In this study, it was found that fi nes for administrative off enses in public procurement are not imposed at levels close to the maximum limit allowed by law, but account for an average of 4.4 % of this value. Other factors aff ecting the amount of the fi ne were the estimated value of the public contracts, the number of off enses committed, the number of extenuating or aggravating circumstances, or the types of award procedures.
In his book Th e Eff ectiveness of the Functioning of the Control Systems of Public Procurement in the Czech Republic
For now, it is worth exploring the OPC in terms of clarifying the operation of the Offi ce from the perspective of an analysis of the resources used, an analysis of incentives to audit activities, as well as elucidating the external factors which infl uence the behavior of the Offi ce. Th e monograph by Nemec et al (2010) examines the control system of public administration in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. In the book, we fi nd one paragraph which deals with the problem of control by the OPC and one paragraph which deals with the activities of "the Offi ce for Public Procurement" in the Slovak Republic.
Our study off ers additional insight into the Offi ce for Protection of Competition. It examines the OFC in terms of an input-process-output model, defi nes the inputs needed for its activities and examines the outputs of its control activities. It also identifi es external factors (in the environment) that aff ect the performance and behavior of the OFC and have an impact on inspection activities. Th e theoretical background as well as assumptions are then subjected to empirical scrutiny.
Th eoretical conclusions and recommendations for more eff ective control of public contracts are drawn from the conclusions which are established.
Conceptual and theoretical framework
We utilize the input-output-process-output model (see Leontief 1986, Lahr and Dietzenbacher 2001; Miller and Blair 1985) as the default tool for explaining the problem. We do not use quantitative analysis, however, but simplify and adjust it so that we can: a) see how OFC works, b) determine what the inputs, processes and outputs are, c) simultaneously identify key external factors infl uencing the behavior of the OFC. A simplifi ed diagram of the problem is shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 Th e OPC as an input-process-output-outcome system
External factors determining the behavior of the OFC Input: employees, budget, number of subjects Process: decision making in the areas of public contacts and review
Output: Number of decisions issued, the volume of fines and deposits appeal against the OFC's decisions Source: Authors Th e model allows for the exploration of the OPC as a production system which transforms the given resources, during the process of its activities, into outputs and results of its inspection activities.
Regarding inputs, we will be observing the role of fi nance (budget changes) and staff (changes in the number of staff ). Th e Offi ce as a production system transforms given resources into its activities (review procedures) and generates outputs in the form of the eff ects of the review procedures. Th e inputs for decision-making at the Offi ce also include a petition from actors (bidders) and the contracting authorities which prepare the tender documentation and announce the tender procedure. Regarding these actors, we assume that they make decisions in conditions of limited rationality (Simon 1959; Tversky and Kahneman 1981) . Individual contracting authorities have diff erent volumes and qualities of information and also diff erent professional capacities to prepare tender documentation.
A number of external factors have a signifi cant infl uence on the functioning of the OPC. Th ese are such factors which actually (or potentially) aff ect the functioning and the existence of the Offi ce. In particular, these include politicians, the government, the public and also the regulations and specifi cations regarding the functioning of the Offi ce (Act No. 273 / 1996 Coll., regarding the competence of the Offi ce for the Protection of Competition and from the review of public contracts and, understandably, the Public Procurement Act and the administrative procedure). We will monitor how the OPC will react to the impact of these factors in its activities. For signs ("indicators") of these reactions, we will consider the outputs (eff ects) from the review of the activities of the OPC.
Institutional role and activities of the OPC
Th e OPC is an independent central state administrative body. Its activities are established by law regarding the scope of the Offi ce for the Protection of Competition. Th e OPC imposes (in addition to creating conditions for the promotion and protection of competition) its power in the exercise of oversight of the awarding of public contracts. Oversight over the awarding of public contracts means checking, by means of review procedures, public procurements.
Th e theory and practice diff erentiates between two models of review procedures -single-stage and two-stage review procedures (see Biandi and Guidi 2010) . In the single-stage procedure, which can be described as the "mono-institutional", the procedures for the awarding of public contracts are subject only to judicial review. Th e single-stage review procedure is used in, i.e., Th e United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium and Sweden. In a single-stage review procedure, all operations which are related to the awarding of public contracts and to contracts, are handled by a single authority (a specifi c court). Th e Court has jurisdiction over the review of operations related to the awarding of public contracts while imposing remedial measures, ordering interim measures and making the ruling to rectify damage. In this case, however, it is typically possible to fi le an appeal with a higher court.
Th e Czech Republic (like Slovakia and Hungary) uses a two-stage model (biinstitutional) review procedure. As the name suggests, the processes of public procurement are reviewed in two stages or, respectively, two types of institutions, and in the course of each stage, there can be further appeal mechanisms. In the Czech Republic, the authority to review procedures in public procurements has been entrusted to the Offi ce for Protection of Competition, therefore an authority outside the court system. Th e authority may, based on the results of the review procedure, decide to impose remedial measures or proceed to the imposition of fi nes. A party may also seek to appeal to a higher authority (lodged with the director of the offi ce), which would be resolved by the Section of two-stage decision-making at the OPC. Aft er exhausting all possibilities for redress within the OPC, a judicial review is also possible, which would take place before the Regional Court in Brno and possibly the Supreme Administrative Court.
Behavior of the OPC towards external actors and the associated impacts on its operation
Since the OPC is a government authority that performs the rational choice in an uncertain world (Simon 1959; Hastie and Dawes 2010) , we expect that in examining its behavior, we will identify "opportunity" as it is characterized by institutional economics (Williamsson 1981 (Williamsson , 1991 . In terms of its existence and ability to function, the OPC is, in fact, dependent on the decisions of external actors -especially legislators (creating the rules of its operation) and the government as an executive body that establishes the number of personnel and infl uences the level of its budget. We believe, therefore, that the Offi ce will behave in an opportunistic manner towards these authorities. Th is may, for example, manifest itself in a way that will emphasize the social importance and necessity of their activities, as well as increase the amount of the assigned tasks, a side-eff ect of which may be the subsequent growth of its budget and staff (Niskanen 1971 (Niskanen , 1994 .
We expect that the behavior of the OFC will be characterized by such decisions and actions which will affi rm the importance of its position. Th e role of assuming administrative proceedings ex offi cio is likely to be important in the OFC's activities, such as investigations, although they may have been initiated by a third party, but it is a procedure initiated on its own activity, whose launch depends on the sole discretion of the OFC. Such action corresponds to the logic of administrative behavior (Simon 1947 ) and the ideas of law and economics (Cooter and Ulen 2011; Friedman 2000) .
We term the activities that the OFC carries out on its own initiative "activities with an expected eff ect of the decision. " We understand that the result of the review activity, ex offi cio, it highly likely to result in a judgment imposing a fi ne or corrective action. Th e initiation of proceedings ex offi cio in fact occur mainly in cases where the OFC has doubt about the awards procedure in a given public contract upon preliminary investigation. Th e quantity of these proceedings is at the discretion of the OFC, which through an increase in their number may seek to increase the resources for their own activities. Such behavior, which consists of increasing the number of investigations in which violations of the law were found, meets the expectations of those actors (legislators) who set the regulations of the OFC and the actors who make decisions about allocating resources to the OFC, itself. Th erefore, we believe that most of the outcomes of the examination procedure initiated ex offi cio, when completed, test positive for the imposition of a fi ne. A fi ne (as an output and an eff ect of the decision) is an instrument, which the OFC may use to outwardly express their "social importance" ("affi rmation"). At the same time, we expect a defi nite increase in said proceedings. Th is is due to the prosecution of socially less serious infractions.
But we believe that if the OFC conducts a review investigation on external initiative, e.g. where administrative proceedings are initiated against a petition, it will opt for a more "opportunistic strategy". On the one hand, it will seek to reaffi rm its social importance, but also, because it takes place in the conditions of a "bound rationality", it will proceed cautiously regarding its "administrative behavior" in order not to get bogged down in complicated problems. It will also likely avoid solving complicated and controversial cases that carry high transaction costs or loss of professional reputation, and in these cases it will look for diff erent procedural grounds for termination of the investigation.
Research questions
With a view to the aims of this article, we have defi ned the following research questions which have been derived from our concept of the OFC's activities and is based on the model of input-process-output. Th e aim of this study is to try to look for answers to the research questions, to discuss the achieved results of the examination and to make theoretical generalizations and recommendations for practice in the context of the theoretical framework and empirical analysis.
Methods and data
For the research, the following methods were used: desk research (especially in the analysis of administrative decisions and other documents of the OPC), interviews (consultations) with OFC.
Data were obtained from the website of the OFC (www.uohs.cz). For clarification and specifi cation of information, we contacted the OFC in the form of an offi cial inquiry. To analyze the impact of selected characteristics of public contracts, we used data on public contracts, whose announcement and awarding were published in the Journal of Public Procurement in 2007 and 2014 (including canceled contracts). Th e total is a set of 99,204 contracts. Th ese data were combined with information about administrative decisions issued during the period of January 2011-March 2015. Th e given decisions are published in the Collection of decisions of the OFC. In total there were 1965 fi rst-degree decisions. Th is data, however, contained more than one decision on the same contract or decision on contracts that are not published in the Bulletin (e.g. small-scale public contracts, cases where the contracting authority failed to publish or failed to track the corresponding entry). A total of 917 contracts searched for were included in the Bulletin of public procurement, which was led by the administrative management of the OPC. From these, 772 review procedures were initiated against the proposal, while in 295 cases it was noted that there had been violations of the law by the contracting authority.
We take into account the aspects of public contracts when defi ning selected characteristics which are available in the Bulletin of public procurement. Of these, we follow these characteristics of public contracts for our study: the type of the contracting authority (regional or local authority, national or federal authority, public institutions, regional or local authority, ministry or other body, other) and the type of tender (open, restricted, negotiated procedure without publication, negotiated procedure with publication, direct entry / award, other).
In this article, we do not use econometric models. We do focus, however, on the graphical representation of the probability of the impact of selected characteristics on the decisions of the Offi ce for the Protection of Competition. To interpret the results, we have utilized the methods of analysis, synthesis and generalization.
Results and discussion

Research question no. 1
Th e fi rst research question focuses on the analysis of fi nancial and human resources needed to perform the review activities of the OFC. Clear data on the numbers of staff and budget amounts are shown in the following table. From the data regarding the number of staff in individual years, it is clear that the changes in the numbers in the table (as well as in the structure of the Offi ce) to a large extent depend on changes to the rules (Public Procurement Act) of public tenders. It is possible to point to a signifi cant increase in staff in 2012, when a new amendment to the Public Procurement Act (No. 55 / 2012 Coll.) was adopted. It was adopted on the basis of a government bill. Th e aim was to enhance transparency in public procurement. At the same time there was a reduction in the thresholds for awarding public contracts in the Act.
2 Th ese are all factors that induced increased (additional) requirements for control (supervisory) activities within the OPC. Th e Offi ce (quite rightly) called on the government to increase the number of staff as well as the budget. Towards this end, they used the advantage of information asymmetry and relatively easily achieved the increase in the number of staff as well as the budget. Th is issue in general is shown by Niskanen (1971 Niskanen ( , 1994 .
Th e following chart further outlines the growth rate of complaints received, i.e. fi led, which could serve as an impetus to initiate proceedings ex offi cio, while there is also an obvious increase in the number of fi led complaints. Due to the signifi cant proportion of complaints relating to contracts fi nanced from EU subsidies as well as ones dealing with the subsidies given by relevant authorities, we assume that the increase in the number of complaints fi led could, inter alia, be caused by a higher number of grant audits by the end of the project period.
Graph 1
Number of complaints fi led with the OPC regarding public-procurement matters We collectively state that if we look at the results through the lens of the bases defi ned in the theoretical part of our analysis, we can say that some of our results at fi rst glance indicate a tendency towards increasing the budget as well as the number of personnel. Th e number of employees between 2010 and 2014 increased by 185.27 % (of that, the department of public contracts by 277.42 %), and the total budget of the offi ce increased by 179.64 %. Th e increase in the budget had the most dynamic shift between 2012 and 2013, which is partly related to personnel changes in 2011 and 2012. Th is increase was mainly caused by the increase in personnel due to the adoption of a transparency amendment to the Public Procurement Act (2012), which was due to an expected increase in the number of public contracts caused by a decrease in the limits on public contracts according to the Public Procurement Act.
Research question no. 2
Th e second research question is focused on the exploration of activities in the area of public contracts carried out by the OPC. According to our fi ndings, the OPC mainly carried out these activities
• Making decisions on the submitted petitions and possibly imposing remedial measures,
• Saving public contracts on the basis of complaints, which can lead to the initiation of proceedings ex offi cio, which typically threatens the imposition of a fi ne,
• To a limited extent, the OPC is responsible for general inquiries and issuing guidelines.
As mentioned in the theoretical foundations, a mere investigation of public contracts carried out by the Offi ce for Protection of Economic Competition can be held in two forms. First, there is a less formal investigation of a public contract based on a received complaint (as defi ned in § 42 of the Administrative Code), where if the Offi ce fi nds suspicion that the alleged contracting authority's approach is not in accordance with the law, it will initiate administrative proceedings ex offi cio. Th e reality is that it depends solely on its own discretion whether the OPC launches proceedings or not.
Initiated administrative proceedings are already more formalized and governed by the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Code. Administrative proceedings are concluded by a decision or the coming into force of the relevant decision (which subsequently leads to the publication of these decisions on the website of the OFC). Proceedings initiated ex offi cio typically lead to a fi ne. Less common are cases where a remedy is imposed or where there is a termination of the proceeding due to infractions of the law not being found.
Th e second group consists of administrative proceedings initiated at the request of the contractor (in accordance with § 114 of the Public Procurement Act), where formal proceedings commence automatically upon the delivery of a petition. Th e proposed proceedings have more participants, which is between the petitioner and the contracting authority (and possibly the selected tenderer), and OFC makes a decision regarding which side is in the right. It is oft en carried out in the investigation that a preliminary injunction will be issued prohibiting the contracting authorities from concluding a contract before the investigation has been completed. Th e supplier (petitioner), on the other hand, is required to pay a deposit (for the proceedings), which will be reimbursed if the petition is accepted. At proceedings based on a petition, the contractor seeks to impose a corrective measure consisting of cancelling a single act of the contracting authority or the entire procurement procedure. In these proceedings, the petitioner can therefore be ruled to have just cause and ordered corrective action (in this case, the contracting authority pays the costs in the amount of CZK 30,000). When the OPC agrees with the contracting authorities and rejects the petition, the deposit is forfeited (1 % of the bid price, at least CZK 50,000) to the state budget. Administrative proceedings can also be terminated on procedural grounds, for example if the petition does not meet the appropriate requirements or if the party of the alleged misconduct corrects itself.
Graph 2
Number of administrative proceedings commenced in the area of public contracts, upon petition or ex offi cio 
Number of administrative procedures
Upon petition Ex officio
Source: Annual Reporting of the OFC. Th eir own compilation.
Th e chart clearly shows that the number of administrative procedures over the years has grown, the greatest growth is seen in ex-offi cio proceedings. Th e increase may be caused by two kinds of sources. First, there is the previously mentioned changes in the amendment to the Public Procurement Act and also the mentioned "opportunistic" (or "affi rmative") behavior of the OPC toward outside authorities (legislators, government). It can be assumed that the Offi ce is seeking increased confi rmation (affi rmation) in its monitoring activities to reaffi rm its social importance and necessity. Th e increase in the number of petition-based proceedings, additionally, may relate either to changes in the law on public procurement, greater competition among bidders or information asymmetries of the appealing parties. Th ey have comprehensive information about the problem and therefore rely on good faith in order to achieve success. Another cause may be speculative motives associated with the expected suspension and cancellation of the competition.
A part of the second research question also seeks answers regarding how selected factors infl uence the likelihood of actions being initiating by the OPC.
Th e following chart shows the average representation (probability) of the review procedures at the Offi ce of Administrative Procedure (petition submissions, discovered irregularities) occurring for diff erent types of contracting authorities. Th e chart shows clearly that, according to the classifi cation of contracting authorities used by the Bulletin of Public Contracts, a greater likelihood of initiating proceedings lay with the regional and local authorities.
3 Th is fi nding may be explained by the fact that the local authorities (unlike ministries) have a much less professional capacity regarding the quality required for the preparation of tender documentation. At the municipal level, the person who oft en handles the tender dossier has neither a legal nor an economic education. It is therefore more likely that there will be greater error at the local level.
Th e following chart shows the average representation (probability) of the review procedures at the Offi ce of Administrative Procedure (petition submissions, discovered irregularities) occurring for diff erent types of award procedures. Th e graph shows that the highest probability of initiating proceedings and violation of the law occurs in restricted award procedure. Probability values are signifi cantly higher. In our opinion, this is due to the degree of competition when open and a restricted awarding process containing a higher level of competition than other types of award procedure and this leads to a higher motivation of unsuccessful suppliers giving petition to the regulator.
Research question no. 3
In research question number three, we will focus on analyzing the economic results of the OPC, the number of decisions handed down to the OPC and the success rate of the OPC during their defense.
Th e following table shows the "Economic balance" of the results of the OPC. Source: Annual Reports of the OPC.
As a partial evaluation of the research question, we can say that the dramatic increase of the collected fi nes by the OPC was very interesting. In the period from 2010 to 2014 the increase was 634.16 %; the greatest swing upwards occurred between 2012 and 2013. Th e proceedings initiated ex offi cio had a very similar increase compared to the above activities (450.65 %). From the above information, it can be concluded that the increased activity of the OPC is fulfi lling expectations. It has set the fi ght against corruption as one of its priorities. Th e number of administrative procedures is perceived by the government as an "indicator" of anticorruption activities in the fi eld of public contracts. However, in our view, this is a simplifi ed view of the problem.
Another possible explanation is related to the increase in personnel, budget growth and "opportunistic" behavior of the OPC towards external authorities. If the OPC has a larger number of staff , it may perform more review investigations, and therefore we can expect a greater number of fi nes imposed. Th e Offi ce simultaneously demonstrates its own importance by the higher number of fi nes imposed and also wants to show outwardly that the growth of the budget and the higher number of staff leads "to larger eff ects" (a greater number of fi nes).
Based on our calculations (the average size of a public contract in 2014 was approximately 30.2 million CZK), we estimate that in 2014 (based on fi led petitions or initiative) the OPC examined public contracts with a total value of 50 billion CZK, or approximately 9 % of the value of public contracts awarded in that year.
Th e cases of review procedures ex offi cio confi rm our assumption about the likely imposition of fi nes as a result of this proceeding. Th e imposition of fi nes occurred in 93 % of these cases. Th is fi nding, together with an increase in the number of these procedures is consistent with the idea of "affi rmation" (eff orts of the OPC to demonstrate outwardly their "social necessity").
In the table below we analyze the decisions of the Offi ce for Protection of Competition in cases of administrative proceedings commenced on the basis of a fi led petition to investigate the actions of the contracting authority. The contracting authority itself set aside the action or the entire tender procedure altogether 37 13.3
Cessation due to the contracting authority concluding the contract 18 6.5
Other reason to stop the proceedings devoid of reason 15 5.4
Source: Reports of OPC, own calculations
As already mentioned, within the OPC, it is possible to use ordinary means of remedy. Proceedings for things specifi c to public contract before the OPC do not always have to fi nish once a decision has been handed down at the fi rst level as any of the parties may take advantage of the appeal, by therefore fi ling an appeal to the Offi ce of the Chairman (a parallel appeal). Since there is no fee for fi ling this appeal in any way, and since there is the possibility to achieve an extension of the length of administrative proceedings using this method, it is a widely used option.
Th e results of the submitted appeals against the decision of fi rst instance is shown in the following graph and table: The number of appeals Based on an analysis of the data and our calculations, it has been shown that the success rate of the submitted petitions (from the perspective of the petitioner) is quite small. Th is means that the OPC in most cases won based on its position. Th is may be due to various causes. Firstly, one cause may be the factor of informational asymmetry (a lack of information) on the part of the appellant, and, additionally, their appeal can be weighed down by subjectivism due to low professional (legal) capacity (some participants do not have their own legal services to aid in the appeals, nor do they have the fi nances to outsource legal assistance). Th e OPC is, however, a specialized department with the appropriate professional (legal) capacity to perform the review activities. It can be assumed that their fi ndings will likely be correct. Another explanation off ered is the "demonstrative behavior" of the OPC. Since the OPC is, in terms of its existence and operation, dependent on the decisions of external stakeholders (legislators, government,) it is not interested in "demonstrating" that the decisions it has arrived at will ultimately prove to be incorrect.
More insight into the issues of the demonstrative eff ect of the operations of the OPC is brought to light from the data regarding the success rate of proceedings before independent courts, meaning when there is an offi cial judicial review of the situation.
Table 5
Success of the OPC before the courts
Number of complaints submitted to the Regional Court in Brno 42
Number of cassation complaints fi led to the Supreme Administrative Court 26
Number of lawfully terminated judicial proceedings in both instances 40
Of these Decision of the OPC confi rmed 25
Decision of the OPC overruled 15
Success rate of the decision of the Offi ce with respect to the total number of issued decisions (I and II instance) 99 % Source: Annual Report of the OPC 2014
Th e 99 % success rate of the OPC in relation to the total number of decisions (the number presented by the OPC) confi rmed the information superiority of the offi ce along with the eff ort to demonstrate an almost fl awless course of decisionmaking authority. For comparison, the success rate of the OPC in the courts, measured against their decisions, against which administrative actions were actually fi led, in the given year amounted to 62.5 %.
Th ere is, in fact, not much relevant data available regarding the duration of the administrative proceedings before the OPC. Th e OPC, in 2015, followed the average period for issuing a decision of fi rst instance by the Administrative Procedure Code. Th e resulting average was 32.95 days (41.8 days, excluding orders 4 ). Th is indicator, however, is not relevant to the OPC in terms of the length of the investigation, since that period begins to run when the OPC has all materials available to it, and if the OPC detects any formal defects in the petition, this time limit is set to zero regardless of the actual length of proceedings. Th e mentioned period also ends with the release of the fi rst-instance decision, and if an appeal is fi led by any participant, the proceedings continue before the OPC at the second instance. According to our fi ndings reached in 2015, the average time of issuance of a second-instance decision (upon receipt of appeal aft er the decision) is 154 days.
Based on our fi ndings, we further note that there are eff orts to decrease the length of time being taken to issue fi rst-instance administrative proceedings. Th at could suggest that there are eff orts of the OFC to prove its "social utility". However, it should be noted that apparently the lengths of proceedings before the Offi ce as a whole remain problematic, while relevant data to confi rm this allegation were not available. Th is is probably related to the problem of "over-legislation", which is highlighted by Nemec et al. (2014) . As a result of the extensive increases in legal regulation, the considerable clutter of the system has also increased. It also can induce increases in the budget and increases in administrative procedures. Th is phenomenon also creates space for partial ineffi ciency and creates "slack" for running the offi ce.
Conclusion
Th e analysis of empirical data in most cases confi rmed the theoretical background and presumptions which we mentioned in our study. Th e expected growth of budget and staff , which is caused both by legislative changes in the Public Procurement Act and probably the authorities' eff orts to maximize the budget (see Niskanen's model of bureaucracy and ineffi ciency) was also confi rmed. It also confi rmed the increase in the number of review proceedings initiated ex offi cio, where the results of the proceedings are mostly positive. When fi ling an appeal, there was a very low success rate for the appellants. Th is may indicate a relatively high professional capacity of the OPC to conduct review procedures, but it may also indicate great eff orts to demonstrate their professional capacity and social importance to the outside world. Th e analysis also showed that the probability of a review procedure depends on the professional capacity (or type) of the contracting authority. Th e likelihood of review proceedings is higher in governments than in central public-administration bodies. Th is is likely for local authorities (municipalities) as they do not possess the necessary legal services for the preparation of tender documentation. It turns out also that the probability of a review procedure is infl uenced by the type of procurement procedure. Th is information is particularly important for contracting authorities when deciding on the type of award procedures.
However, there were also some new problems and some issues that require further investigation. It turns out that a two-tier model of the review procedure seems complicated, less fl exible and likely puts even higher transaction costs on processes related to the supervision of public procurement. What is missing is the necessary data which would enable the execution of a proper analysis confi rming or rebutting that presumption (hypothesis). Addiotionally, even lawyers have reservations regarding the two-stage model of review procedures in the Czech Republic (see Jurčík 2014) .
Th e assumption that the the OPC will avoid tackling complicated and controversial cases that carry high transaction costs and the risk of damage to their professional reputation and conversely deal with those that are not too complex, has failed to be proved or disproved exactly. Th at would have required extensive data and the performance of quantitative and qualitative research. Th is presumption has not been rebutted by us or in consultation with OPC experts (workers). Th is question remains open for further research.
In addition, it is not unequivocally demonstrated what the real economic eff ects of an increase in the use of resources are. Th e OPC reviews only the formal aspects of procurement procedures. It does not pursue economic indicators (e.g. "the rescued value"). Within its activities (in accordance with the Public Procurement Act) it monitors only the procedural aspects of public procurement. It does not pursue the economic eff ects of public procurement (value for money). It is an institution that persistently and stubbornly prevents the integration of the principles of 3E into the Public Procurement Act. It is also one of the reasons why we are unable to clearly answer the question what the economic eff ects of the review activities of the OPC are.
